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Five problems are addressed: (1) the role of competent actors in the venture capital and exit markets  
supporting the industrialization of winning technologies in small innovative firms, (2) the competence 
of the large firm to integrate large-scale operational efficiency with small-scale innovative capability 
through distributed development work and integrated production and (3) the importance of  viable 
markets for strategic acquisitions, both in making this possible and in allowing a flexible choice for 
the small firm between growing aggressively on its own through own acquisitions, or being acquired 
strategically itself. We  (4) find that the less developed markets in continental Europe may be a 
disadvantage compared to the US in ushering in a future New Economy. We finally (5) discuss what 
becomes of the Coasian theory of the firm when production is constantly outsourced in, or insourced 
from the market as the relative efficiency of coordination through management and over the market 
changes.  
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1.  The  Problems  
 
The last couple of decades have seen an  increase in the fragmentation over markets of  firms 
as  centrally coordinated hierarchies (Eliasson 1986b, 1996b, 2001a,b). Products have been 
modularized and the production of components or entire systems outsourced in the market, 
only to be insourced again at some later stage. Coase (1937) outlined the principles behind 
such organizational change when explaining the rationale for the existence of the firm as a 
hierarchy in those instances in which management has a transaction cost advantage over 
production coordination. Holmström-Tirole (1989) extend that notion of a firm to a ”contract 
between a multitude of parties” imposed over the market to ” minimize transactions costs 
between specialized factors of production”. Since this is an authoritative statement in the 
Handbook of Industrial Organization on the theory of the firm, we begin there.  
Empirically integrated development work and production distributed over markets are 
becoming an increasingly important productivity factor in the emerging industrial technology  
(Eliasson 1996b, Jovanovic-Rosseau 2002, Lerner-Mergers 1997) moved, notably, by modern 
computer and communications technology. Firms are reorganizing through acquisitions and 
divestments to gain competitive advantage. Both the notion of a firm and the structure of 
markets for control, hence, are experiencing radical change. To integrate the organizational 
problem of firms that have to rely on the external market for innovations with the theory of 
the firm, the notion of the reorganization of production structures over markets has to be 
endogenized . This means not only accepting complexity, ignorance and business failure, but 
also making business mistakes part of transaction costs. This disrupts the exogenous 
equilibrium properties of the neoclassical model. Transaction costs can no longer be 
minimized independently of the production organization. Further, the story to follow argues 
that it is empirically unacceptable to structure the theory of the firm such that this is possible. 
  
We use competence bloc theory (Eliasson – Eliasson 1996, 2002a) to (1) model the firm as an 
endogenously changing organization distributed over markets, the extended firm (Eliasson 
1996b),  and (2) to demonstrate that an endogenous hierarchy makes it possible  
simultaneously to achieve both the narrow focus needed for operations efficiency and the 
broad exposure to a maximum of varied competence needed to be dynamically
1 efficient in 
                                                           
1 The reader should observe already here that this notion of dynamics takes us far beyond the neoclassical notion 
of dynamics, that often uses the attribute as soon as a time variable figures in the equations.   3
the Austrian-Schumpeterian environment of the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE, 
Eliasson 1987,1992). More precisely, we address the existence of a market for strategic 
acquisitions as a source of systemic productivity gains (”economies of scale”) and a mover of 
industrial dynamics. The problem addressed is elucidated by the fact that the large firm, 
normally oriented towards large-scale operational efficiency (Eliasson 1976, 1984, 1996a, 
2001b, Acs – Audretscht 1988), has problems with its innovative capabilities. Small firms, on 
the other hand, are less formally organized and more flexible and, therefore, thought to be 
more capable of innovative achievement. The small firms, oriented towards innovative 
performance and pursuing radically new innovations, by contrast, suffer from the ignorance 
of the financial community when it comes to understanding what the firm is doing and the 
high financial risks for the innovators/ entrepreneurs associated with taking a winning 
innovation through industrial scale production. The industrial competence of the actors in the 
financial markets intermediating trade in intangible knowledge assets, therefore, is a key 
concern. Here we draw directly on the property rights analysis explored in the companion 
paper (Eliasson-Wihlborg (2003)). 
 
Venture capitalists, as we define them (Eliasson – Eliasson 1996, Eliasson 2003), are 
characterized by their competence and capacity to understand radically new business ideas 
and provide reasonably priced financing. But the little firm doing it on its own faces the 
additional problem of being too slow in reaching industrial scale, and, therefore, risks being 
overtaken or imitated by a larger firm with ample financial resources.  The second part of the 
same problem is the increasing inability of large business firms to do it all and to efficiently 
incorporate or internalize all the needed competences within one hierarchy. The large firms 
normally have the financial capacity to buy and possibly also the competence to discover and 
to access new technology at fairly advanced stages of development and close to their core 
business, but have problems with their indigenous capacity to create the same technology. In 
addition, the large firm normally has great difficulties introducing radically new technology 
in its operations-oriented organization because of the lack of receiver competence and a 
consequent skeptical attitude among the staff to the introduction of novel and organizationally 
disrupting ideas (Eliasson, 1976, 1984, 1990a, Eliasson-Granstrand 1985). In Holmström´s 
(1993) model, this is explained in terms of a bureaucratization that arises because of the 
higher transactions costs associated with ”mixing hard to measure activities (innovations) 
with easy to measure activities ( routine)”.  For the large firm, there is the additional problem   4
of competence supply, notably of innovative, technological variety that has become critical 
for survival in the new economy. Since the single firm normally lacks the capacity of 
internally supplying all the needed variety of innovative services, the solution has 
increasingly become to acquire complementary services externally.  For this to be possible, 
the advanced manufacturing firm has to access the broad and deep markets of subcontractors. 
The more advanced and the more dependent on R&D, the more important it is that 
technological supplies can be outsourced. Outsourcing of technological development is a 
difficult part of advanced production that has become necessary and has been seriously 
learned only in the last decade or so as new computing and communication technologies have 
made the integration of globally distributed production feasible (Eliasson 2001b, 2002). We 
look especially at the existence and the role of viable markets for strategic acquisitions
2, and 
how the incentives needed to support such markets depend on competition for their innovative 
services from a varied set of large corporate customers (Eliasson 1986b).  
This paper, hence, focuses on three problems; 
(1)  The venture capital competence needed to discover and to commercialize radically  
new technology in, and support expansion of, the small  firms , 
(2)  the competence of the large firm to integrate large-scale operational efficiency with 
small-scale innovative capacity through distributed development work and 
production integrated over the market, and 
(3)  the conditions for the existence of  viable markets for strategic acquisitions that offer  
profitable choices for the small innovative firms to pursue their own growth plans 
and/or (second best) to aim at being strategically acquired. This choice will be seen 
as a determining incentive for a rich supply of innovative firms. 
The critical role of appropriately designed contractual rights to knowledge to establish the 
tradability in intellectual capital needed to support knowledge creation and allocation over   
markets for strategic acquisitions has already been addressed in the companion paper 




                                                           
2 The implicit assumption of Arrow (1962) that technological services can be outsourced to technical 
universities and government-run laboratories is based on the assumptions of the static general equilibrium model 
with zero transactions costs, and is simply a misconception in this context, even though it has been extensively 
used in the theoretical innovation literature. See further below.   5
2. Background  Theory 
The classical representation of a firm is that of a monolithic hierarchy controlled from the top. 
Before Coase (1937), and even decades after the publication of his article, most economists 
bothered neither about the firm nor about the organization of the economy. They were 
concerned solely with analyzing industries in which live firms disappeared in aggregates. 
 Marshall (1890, and notably 1919) wanted to change this situation and is credited by 
Schumpeter (1954) with having been the first to bring business economics into economic 
theory. His ”representative firm” was an attempt to deal with the aggregation problem, 
although his ”industrial district” analysis is more innovative and to the point in this context. 
This analysis featured a network of subcontractors -- an organization of production within 
which systemic productivity gains could be captured -- that allowed him to make increasing 
returns compatible with the then-dominant Walrasian model. Marshall’s industrial district 
included already in 1890 a micro-based formulation of what  later (in the 1980s) came to be 
called ”new (macro) growth theory”.   
 Coase (1937) recognized that the outer limits of the firm were determined by the relative 
costs (transactions costs) to coordinate the business through a hierarchy and through the 
market. The ”hierarchy” or firm became endogenized and changed in response to market 
forces, drawing significant transaction costs. Arrow (1965) emphasized the role of the 
organization in bearing risks where the market failed.  But organization is a more general  
instrument  to cope with competitive change  . This makes it natural to extend the Coasian 
(1937) model to handle also the dynamics of the new, loosely structured extended firms 
(Eliasson 1996a,b, 1998b) that constantly reconfigure their internal structure and trade in 
parts over the  M&A market .  
In neoclassical  R&D based innovation functions, the roles of the innovator, the entrepreneur 
and the venture capitalist are collapsed into one. Technology becomes a linear driver of 
growth. Also Joseph Schumpeter´s (1942) superior scientifically-based firm that would 
eventually dominate its market is based on a  linear technology growth relationship. The 
organization of innovative activity and of  ”The Markets for Innovation, Ownership and 
Control” ( Day – Eliasson – Wihlborg (1993)) may, however, matter not only  for innovative 
output but also for the link  between innovative output  and economic growth. Once that 
possibility has been recognized, the intersection between hierarchies and markets (the 
organization of the firm) becomes endogenized and tradability in technology assets becomes a 
determining factor.  Control rights to assets is the signum of a firm as a hierarchy and the   6
optimal assignment of assets is one way to understand the boundaries of the firm (Hart-Moore 
1990). But a firm is more than a contractual arrangement to allocate ownership, control and 
responsibilities of the parties involved (Holmström-Tirole 1989). The financial structure is 
not independent of the underlying production organization; for instance, the choice between 
outsourcing and internalizing through vertical integration  also depends on the control of 
production desired ( Lewis-Sappington 1991)
3.  
The competence embodied in the hierarchy can be improved by reassigning control rights to 
the actors with maximum competence to run the business (Aghion-Tirole 1994), who might in 
turn change the production organization. A different authority (hierarchy) can thus be 
superimposed on, and exceed the limits of, the Coasian firm. The stronger the property rights, 
the more tradable technology assets and the stonger the influence on production organization 
(Eliasson-Wihlborg 2003). This reassignment has a precise meaning in the knowledge-based 
information economy (Eliasson 1990b), featuring large information and communications 
costs and a virtually unlimited set of business opportunities. Firms, defined as competent 
teams (Eliasson 1990a), are normally grossly ignorant about circumstances relevant to their 
business and long-run survival, not least about what competitors are up to. They, therefore, 
set up business experiments to the best of their knowledge, which sometimes succeed, but 
often fail. Business mistakes, therefore, become a normal cost for economic development and 
part of the transaction costs incurred when doing business. Hence the term the Experimentally 
Organized Economy ( EOE). The central firm (management) problem in the EOE now 
becomes to minimize the economic costs of two types of errors, namely (Table 2A) to keep 
business mistakes on the books for too long and to lose the winners. We identify the  scope of 
the organization called a firm within which management  can do this. The key problem is to 
avoid losing the winners, which for a competent management is perhaps the largest item in 
transactions costs. Part of the competence involved in achieving this is the art of delimiting  
the scope of the firm ( the span of mangement, Simon 1957)
4. Minimizing transaction costs 
cannot be done independently of the excercising of this art. As we will see, this is no trivial 
problem in the theory of the firm. 
                                                           
3 Here Desai-Foley- Hines (2002) observe that US multinationals have, over the last 20 years or so, gone from 
loosely structured alliances to 100 percent ownership control. They explain that by a desire to excercise more 
control in coordinating production and in technology transfer, a development also induced  by a liberalization of 
ownership restrictions in host countries and by trouble with  new US tax reforms when it came to the free use of 
rational  internal transfer prices across borders. 
4 The loss of winners is no problem in the WAD model, since it cannot occur there by assumption (Eliasson 
1992).    7
 Competence bloc theory also deals with this problem of dynamic efficiency in the EOE. In 
competence bloc theory, the creation and selection of projects can be distributed over 
competent actors in the market, or be internalized within the firm.  Hayek (1937) formulated 
this as a parallel to Adam Smith’s dictum of decentralized production, when he discussed the 
”division of knowledge”. 
Knowledge dominates all other physical forms of capital  in determining the productivities of 
other factors of production. But knowledge capital is not well defined and cannot be 
understood and managed analytically under the assumption of full information economics . 
Knowledge is largely tacit and incommunicable, and can only be allocated by knowledge (cf. 
Demsetz 1969 and Pelikan 1986,1988 on economic selforganization). Markets in tacit 
knowledge are often characterized by infinite regresses and the non-existence of an external 
equilibrium.  As a consequence, dynamic efficiency in the sense of minimizing the economic 
consequences of the two types of errors in Table 2A can only be achieved by exposing each 
project to a maximum competent evaluation. That, in turn, can only be achieved in low 
transaction costs markets with well developed property (control) rights that support trade in 
intellectual assets (see Eliasson – Wihlborg 2003).  Attempts to centralize the decision will 
make the decision/selection more narrow and raise the risk of losing winners.  We, therefore, 
introduce competence bloc theory as an organizing device for the distributed (over the 
market) creation, identification and selection of projects in the experimentally organized 
economy (EOE). Competence bloc theory will allow us to identify the markets for 
competence that are critical for the project selection that is key to the efficient solution of all 
three empirical problems of this paper. For this to be possible, however, tradability in the 
competence/control rights or intellectual assets has to be established in the non-equilibrium 
setting of the EOE. 
 
3.   The Commercialization of Winners in the Experimentally Organized 
Economy - the First Problem 
The theory of the EOE features growth through experimental project creation and selection. 
Competence bloc theory explains the nature of that selection, which, in turn, allows us to 
understand the  roles of a venture capital market with industrially competent actors and the 
market for strategic acquisitions in reconfiguring firms into new business combines. These 
two markets exist in, and integrate, the activities of actors in the competence bloc.  
3.1.  The experimentally organized economy   8
The notion of a knowledge-based information economy  (Eliasson 1990b) is used to  establish 
the basic assumption of a  business opportunities set of such  complexity that practically all 
actors become grossly ignorant even of (for them) very relevant circumstances. This means 
that business decisions will have to be seen as more or less well prepared (business) 
experiments that often fail. In this experimentally organized economy ( EOE), growth occurs 
through competitive project creation and selection.  
The EOE offers an alternative to the Walras-Arrow-Debreu (WAD) model (Eliasson 1992), 
the main difference being the assumed dimensions of the (business) opportunities space, or 
state space, and the appearance of significant information and communications (transaction) 
costs in the form of business mistakes. The latter removes the property of an exogeneous 
equilibrium of the WAD model. The WAD model assumes the state space to be extremely 
small and sufficiently transparent for all options to be identified.  In the EOE the state space is 
extremely large and non-transparent. The theory of the EOE thus embodies the experimental 
nature of dynamic markets and allows ignorance and business mistakes natural roles to play . 
It has its roots in the Austrian economics of Carl Menger (1872) and in Schumpeter (1911), 
before Schumpeter turned ”linear” in 1942. The EOE features economic growth through 
experimental creation and selection of innovative projects. A policymaker in the EOE would 
constantly face the problem of efficient exit, i.e. of forcing badly managed incumbents or new 
entrants to exit without exiting winners. This is the dynamic efficiency problem of the theory, 
demanding great and varied competence on the part of actors participating in the selection 
process, including the policy maker if ”it” feels a need to get involved (Eliasson 2000a).  
Salter curve analysis (Salter 1960) then allows the Schumpeterian creative destruction 
process  of Table 1 to be  derived,  and  relates it to macroeconomic growth (see Eliasson 
1996a, Section II.7). 
     (Table 1 and Figure 1 in about here) 
The performance characteristics of an agent can be ranked in each market. The Salter curves 
of Figure 1 exhibit such rankings of rates of return or temporary knowledge rents
5 for two 
years in Swedish industry. Superior firms to the left can outbid lower down firms in hiring 
people, buying components, lowering prices or acquiring firms. But the challenged firms 
                                                           
5 The rates of return shown in Figure 1 minus an appropriate interest rate can be said to measure temporary 
knowledge rents and the incidence of random factors or “luck. Expected such returns to capital over the interest 
rate drive firm investments in the MOSES micro-to-macro model to be referred to in the next footnote . The 
rents so defined have been estimated for the real firms in the so called planning survey of the Federation of   9
know this and have to act to improve their situation, thus challenging the (temporarily) 
superior firm. All incumbents are challenged by new entrants, and challenged firms that 
cannot cope with the situation are forced down the curve, eventually to exit at the low right 
hand corner. Competition is endogenous, forcing organizational innovative behavior as 
represented by the four categories of Table 1. Only if society is ”efficiently” organized and 
equipped with the right institutions and incentives will this dynamically competitive process 
of experimental selection lead to macroeconomic growth through the outward shifting of the 
Salter curves. But endogenous competition could also lead to contraction and exit.
6 The 
problem for the policy maker is to organize institutions such that winners move on and losers 
are forced to release resources, notably competent people, for use by the growing firms. By 
increasing factor supply factor, prices are held down. This dynamic turns exiting losers into 
growth contributors. Dynamic efficiency in the EOE can thus be characterized by the capacity 
of the economic system to ”minimize” the economic consequences of two types of errors in 
the Schumpeterian creative destruction process, shown in Table 1, not to keep losers for too 
long and (most importantly) not to lose the winners (see Table 2A). Competence bloc theory 
organizes tacit knowledge distributed over markets and hierarchies to achieve that outcome.  
      (Tables 2A and B in about here). 
 
3.2.   Competence bloc theory 
The competence bloc (Eliasson – Eliasson 1996, 2002a) lists the minimum number of actors 
with competence needed to minimize the economic consequences of the two kinds of business 
errors. It is a theoretical design that allows an organization of decentralized tacit knowledge 
without specifying the content of knowledge, except by function and carrier. The solution is 
to organize diverse and distributed competences in the economy such that each project is 
exposed to a maximum of competent and varied evaluation. 
The competent customer  (item 1; Table 2B) defines the maximum degree of ”sophistication” 
of the product for which the most advanced customers are willing to pay. Without competent 
customers there will be no markets for sophisticated products. The competence bloc 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Swedish Industries that make up the population of MOSES firms since the mid 1970s (MOSES Data Base). 
Those rents exhibit considerable volatility over the firm population and time. See Albrecht et al (1992). 
6 This Schumpeterian creative destruction process endogenizes economic growth in the Swedish micro-to-macro 
model MOSES ( Ballot-Taymaz 1998, Eliasson 1991,1996a,pp.37ff and Eliasson-Taymaz 2000). Johansson 
(2001) has econometrically tested for the characteristics of firms and their environment that make firms expand 
rather than contract under competitive pressure, i.e. for the circumstances that make the Schumpeterian creative 
destruction process of Table 1 lead to industry growth rather than contraction. Also see Eliasson – Taymaz 
(2000) and Eliasson – Johansson – Taymaz  ( 2002, 2004)    10
incorporates the Burenstam-Linder (1961) idea that advanced customers constitute a 
comparative advantage for the rich industrial countries. During the development of advanced 
products, such as aircraft, technologically knowledgeable customers often contribute directly 
to product technology (Eliasson 1996b). The normal situation, however, is that the customer 
chooses between different product offers. Heterogeneity in the supply of innovative new 
products and the supply of competent customers with varying tastes, therefore, set limits to 
technological advance. 
 
The innovator (item 2) is defined as the actor who combines new and old technologies into 
new composite technologies, to be selected by economic (profitability) criteria by the 
entrepreneurs (item 3).
7 The entrepreneur, in turn, normally needs external financing to move 
expected winners on, but that financing has to be associated with a competence on the part of 
the financial contributor to understand the entrepreneurial selection. Otherwise (Eliasson – 
Eliasson 1996), the conditions will be so tough as to leave little or nothing for the innovator 
and the entrepreneur. The competent venture capitalist (item 4) selects the winning 
entrepreneurs. The venture capitalist, however, needs large and deep exit markets to unload 
his stake with a large profit at the, for him, appropriate time. If a real winner is moving 
through the competence bloc, the next step is for a competent industrialist to take over and 
move the project on to industrial scale production and distribution. The industrialist now acts 
as a customer in the exit market, or rather in the intersection of the venture capital and exit 
markets, that we call the market for strategic acquisitions. By analogy with the earlier 
customer analysis, without a broad range of sophisticated industrialists/customers, an active 
market for strategic acquisitions would not exist, and there would be no real incentives for 
sophisticated entrepreneurial firms to enter the market.  Apparently, all later stages (in the 
competence bloc) are important for incentives to be effective  at the earlier stages. If the 
competence bloc is not vertically complete, the risks are large for the earlier stage innovators 
and entrepreneurs.
8  
                                                           
7 For  theoretical reasons we want to give the innovator a technological  definition. The innovation  is selected 
and transformed  into a  business proposition by the entrepreneur. This is von Mises (1949) rather than 
Schumpeter , who does not distinguish clearly between the two concepts.   
8 The results of  Darby-Zucker (2002) illustrate the difficulties of effective selection and the nature of industrial 
knowledge in the financial community. They find that the quality of biotech firms´ science base measured by the 
number of articles published by academic stars associated with the firm signals economic performance potential 
of the firm ” making it easier to find capital and to obtain it in large amounts”   11
But vertical completeness is not sufficient. One actor of each does not guarantee a varied and 
competent project evaluation. Many of each with very different competences are needed. 
Only when vertical completeness and horizontal variety are in place can critical mass be 
reached and potential winners confidently pursue their search. Increasing returns to 
continued search then prevail and the risks that winners may get lost are minimized. The 
competence bloc then functions as an attractor for advanced firms that both benefit from 
localizing there, and contribute to the further development of the competence bloc. In that 
sense, the advanced firm of the competence bloc also functions as a technological spillover 
source, or as a technical university (Eliasson 1996b). 
The competence bloc transfers valuable and more or less tacit knowledge (” technology”) 
between actors with competence capable of adding value. This transformation takes place in 
the internal markets for innovation within firms or through trade over external markets 
between firms. For this tradability in technology assets to be achieved, the problem of 
establishing property rights to intangible knowledge assets has to be solved. (Eliasson-
Wihlborg 2003). Lamoreaux-Sokoloff (2002) in fact argue that institutional support, notably 
the patent system that ”created secure and tradable property rights in invention” was 
instrumental in commercializing technology and initiating the rapid productivity advance in 
the US economy 1870-1920. 
Some large firms internalize almost entire competence blocs to solve the property rights 
problem, as IBM did in its heyday in the 1970s. It was even an advanced customer of its own 
products, such as advanced microchips. Most large firms internalize significant elements of 
the competence bloc, notably the venture capital function. An internalization of the link 
between the innovator and the industrialist in the competence bloc as shown in Table 2B, 
however, suggests a narrowing of the competence a project is exposed to in the internal firm 
evaluation (in the hierarchy). Distributing the same evaluation over a competence bloc with 
many competent actors means a broader and more varied project evaluation, but produces 
larger transactions costs and introduces an extra element of uncertainty about the distribution 
of rents. That innovative variety may disturb the operational efficiency of a large hierarchy is 
illustrated by a quote from a well known Swedish business leader: ”We would get very 
irritated  at an entrepreneur at the postal office that  delays the morning mail delivery, even 
though this person has interesting ideas about how to improve postal service…….We need   12
some creativity- but not much” 
9.  The standard way of attempting to solve that problem is to 
keep the innovative and operations responsibilities organizationally separate within the firm  
(Eliasson 1976).  
Thus competence bloc theory is sufficient to demonstrate our first proposition of the critical 
role played by competent venture capitalists and exit markets to identify and move winners in 
new technologies on to industrial scale production.  Selection has to be decentralized over 
markets to be truly dynamically efficient
10. Internalizing the competence bloc into one 
hierarchy reduces variety and hence the innovative capabilities of the economic system. 
 
3.3.Redefining transactions costs in the EOE 
The value of an asset depends on the ability of the owner to control its use (management), to 
capture its rents ( access) and to trade in the asset. Hence, the value can be calculated as the 
present value of the rent flow net of transactions costs, and discounted by a market interest 
rate plus an appropriately scaled risk premium (Eliasson 1998a). Restrictions on the control 
rights and on tradability are factored into the risk premium. A particularly important matter 
for the valuation of assets in the EOE is the definition of transaction costs. The mainstream 
model does not recognize business mistakes. The theory of the EOE does. There, the costs of 
business mistakes, in terms of Table 2A, figure as a cost for learning and economic 
development contributing to the creation and commercialization of ”winners”. If incurred 
within one hierarchy, it belongs to its cost structure, with the important distinction that lost 
winners are not charged to any cost account. The business mistakes may have been made in 
other firms, making it possible for a particular firm to learn from these mistakes. The costs are 
then carried by others or society at large. Costs associated with the commitment of business 
mistakes thus have to be included in a correct definition of transaction costs in the EOE. This 
was first recognized by Dahlman (1979). Only then will a market allocation solution to the 
allocation of resources get a fair theoretical comparison with a centralized hierarchical 
solution to the same problem. Only then will it also be possible to understand theoretically 
that a distributed (over the market) reallocation of intellectual assets (”competence capital”) 
                                                           
9 PG Gyllenhammar, then CEO of Volvo, at the 90 years celebration in 1986 of the Swedish Engineering 
Industry Association. For the full quote, see Eliasson  2002, p.97 
10 Efficiency or opportunity costs in the EOE can, however, not (as in WAD theory) be measured by reference to 
a well defined benchmark, i.e. static equilibrium when all actors operate on the production frontiers. There will 
always be unknown better projects that cannot be ”objectively identified”. They are only known to exist 
(Eliasson 1998b, 2001a). Dynamic or Schumpeterian (Eliasson 1985, p. 329f, 1991, p. 165) efficiency is 
measured against a minimum  of lost winners which is indeterminate in the EOE.    13
often is dynamically more efficient than a narrow evaluation within a hierarchy. Even though 
more costly in terms of direct transaction costs, the more varied evaluation reduces the 
incidence of business mistakes and hence total transaction costs, appropriately defined for the 
EOE. Dynamic, or Schumpeterian efficiency is increased.  
The gradual emergence of informed and dynamically efficient markets for corporate control 
increasingly offers distributed (over the market) solutions to the problem of internalizing the 
innovative and operational functions of production. Distributing sophisticated production 
based on tacit competence capital over the market, however, also requires that intellectual 
capital be competently and fairly valued in markets. For this to occur, property rights have to 
be competently assigned such that trade can be established in these values at low transactions 
costs. This particular problem is dealt with in a companion paper (Eliasson – Wihlborg 2003). 
Again, competence bloc theory helps us understand and explain how.  
 
4. Integrating innovative and operational efficiency over the market - the 
Second Problem 
The innovator, the entrepreneur, the venture capitalist (financier) and the efficient large scale 
organizer of production are rarely embodied in the same person or hierarchy. New, winning  
ideas are often lost in an efficient manufacturing environment . Hence, the creation, diffusion 
and introduction of winning innovations in production, the incentives to innovate and to 
industrialize and the sharing of rents from winners are the critical problems of economic 
dynamics and growth. The internal economies of large firms are normally conservative and 
inclined to reject radically new (alien) project proposals, losers and winners alike. The small 
firm, with the radically new idea, on the other hand, does not have the financial resources of 
the large firm. 
   14
Large, successful industrial economies are often dominated by large firms in mature markets, 
excelling in efficient volume production. To strike the right balance between efficient volume 
production and the capacity to innovate, therefore, is as critical for the wealthy industrial 
economy as it is for the large firm.  In the long run, a conservative attitude in the dominant 
part of the industrial establishment of a nation may be detrimental to the supply and 
absorption (receiver competence, Eliasson 1986a,pp.47f, 57f, 1990a, Cohen – Levinthal 
1990) of radically new technology.  Hence, the organization of markets for innovation is a 
core economic design problem in an industrial economy. 
 
    15
4.1   On the existence of a market for strategic acquisitions 
 Outsourcing  innovation over an entire competence bloc is one organizational solution to the 
problem of  project selection. This requires the existence of a market for innovations, which is 
a matter of the existence of venture capital and exit markets ( items 4 and 5 in Table 2B).  The 
exit market, then, becomes a market for strategic acquisitions, offering a supply of radically 
new innovations embodied in ”small new firms”, the innovations having been moved beyond 
the entrepreneurial stage by venture capitalists, who now supply the exit market with strategic 
investment opportunities.  
The existence of such a market for strategic acquisitions cannot be taken for granted.  First, 
rather than being created, selected and carried on to industrial scale production within one 
hierarchy, the same functions are now distributed over subcontractors. Functionality, hence 
(and first), requires the existence of a complete competence bloc that has reached the critical 
mass and variety to identify and move winners up to and into the exit market, where industrial 
buyers wait. Second, since these activities are now organized over the market, involving trade 
in  intangible knowledge assets, the art of defining, assigning and valuing to make the 
requisite property rights tradable becomes critical (see accompanying paper Eliasson – 
Wihlborg 2003). Third, the low internal firm cost of a narrow and often incompetent 
valuation and selection procedure and the loss of winners have to be weighed against the 
higher direct transactions costs over the market to achieve a more informed valuation and a 
better allocation of the total knowledge capital. With the loss of winners included as a 
transactions cost, the distributed market solution now may become the low-cost alternative. 
The incentives that move the market evaluation process are not exogenous, but rest on the 
competence of industrial buyers to understand the projects. Hence, variety among industrial 
buyers (Eliasson 1986b) raises competition for the winners and moves their price  above the 
prices offered by incompetent industrial buyers. The high price is critical. Incompetent 
industrial buyers that have acquired a winner in a distressed situation cheaply can incur large 
losses by making business errors of type II without privately losing much money (see case 
below). For the economy at large, the loss of a better and/or a winning production 
organization may, however, be great. 
 
On the one hand, we have the competent industrial buyers who can pay the right (higher) 
price for industrially valuable innovators because they know how to create value by   16
integrating them into their business. But innovations are not supplied to order by 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in such markets. On the other hand, we have the 
industrially incompetent buyers who shop for cheap acquisitions that may, or may not, turn a 
profit but that often entail a loss of winners because of the industrial incompetence of the 
buyers. Hence, many industrial buyers representing a varied competence are needed to 
support a viable market for strategic acquisitions (Eliasson 1986b). Since biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals are industries where this market is critical, the current merger activity and 
concentration among the large pharmaceutical companies are not a good signal in this 
context. It reduces competition for innovative firms in the market for strategic acquisitions. 
 
4.2  Large systemic productivity gains 
The market for strategic acquisitions offers a way for  large companies to integrate both 
innovative activity and economies of scale volume production within one distributed 
hierarchy, which we will call  an extended Coasian firm or a Marshallian industrial district. 
The combination, if it can be organized, establishes a positive sum game with systemic 
productivity gains. These potential systemic effects also offer incentives for the competent 
and innovative industrial organizer. Competence bloc theory explains the principles for this  
in the EOE. Undeveloped markets for strategic acquisitions have been shown to be a handicap 
for the early stage actors, the innovators, who often have to part with a winner to a financially 
strong, later stage actor. But we can also conclude theoretically that if the big companies 
collude and/or squeeze the prices of strategic innovation offerings, the policy runs against 
their own long-term interests. On the other hand, a market that induces many large companies 
to compete for winning projects is the preferred situation for the small innovative company. 
In underdeveloped markets for strategic acquisitions, on the other hand winners easily go 
undiscovered and large incompetent companies can pick up a winner cheaply and scrap it at a 
small loss if it fails.  In fact, innovators in a badly developed competence bloc with no market 
for strategic acquisitions have to be irrationally overoptimistic to go on innovating at large 
private risk. 
 
4.3  The concept of dynamic or Schumpeterian efficiency 
A reference or a bench mark to define and measure efficiency is needed. We need to know the 
opportunity cost of not doing something in a different and perhaps better way. Such a bench 
mark used frequently among firms is to compare the situation with a best competitor or the   17
best plant in the own firm.
11 Ideally the reference should be the best possible or maximum 
performance. This is in principle easy in mainstream equilibrium modeling where the (full 
information, perfect) equilibrium is associated with the notion of maximum achievable 
performance: if it can be shown to exist, you have a benchmark for efficiency measurement. 
Standard economic analysis ”attempts” to organize its assumptions such that the economic 
model can be solved for such equilibria or exogenous benchmarks. The problems with this 
model, and with such analysis, is how it relates to the underlying reality. We have no such 
principal problem with the theory of the EOE. On the other hand, the EOE has no stable 
exogenous equilibrium to be used as an efficiency reference, but we regard that as an 
advantage. Defining efficiency, however, becomes a problem, because the optimum reference 
or the opportunity cost has to incorporate the hypothetical economic performance of lost 
winners, had they not been lost. This reference is indeterminate since it depends on all factors 
ruling the growth process in the EOE, and the basic idea of the theory of the EOE is that far 
better solutions than the existing ones are possible for those economically motivated to search 
for them and capable of identifying them. Hence, the model of the EOE cannot be solved for 
an external equilibrium.
12   
The indeterminacy of a reference tilts the policy focus away from the analytical ambition of 
the WAD model to use information to determine the best solutions towards a policy ambition 
to design institutions and instead boosts incentives to search for the better solutions and to 
help build the institutional and human capital infrastructure embodied in the competence bloc 
to  ”maximize” the exposure of each project to a competent evaluation. The paradoxical 
coincidence is that the presence of large information and communications costs in production 
when incorporated in the theory of the EOE is what causes this redirection of theoretical 
attention away from information towards institutions and incentives. 
4.4  Failure in the market for strategic acquisitions  
Market failure in the form of lost winners easily occurs in the EOE, and always occurs to 
some extent if the competence bloc is not complete and/or not sufficiently varied horizontally. 
We have to watch our tongue, however. What looks like market failure often originates in 
                                                           
11 Such bench marking in large firms with multiple production facilities of the same kind was common already 
in the early 1970s (see Eliasson 1976, pp. 180 f., cases 13). 
12 We can simulate possible better trajectories involving fewer losses of winners, for comparison, using the 
Swedish micro-to-macro model MOSES, which approximates the EOE (Ballot-Taymaz 1998, Eliasson 1991). 
MOSES is an evolutionary model which develops differently, depending on initial circumstances and the 
discrete choices made by actors in the model during the simulation, and it never settles on an exogenous 
equilibrium path (Eliasson – Taymaz 2000).     18
policy or political failure. For instance, if the tax system makes it impossible for industrially 
experienced and competent rich individuals to develop into venture capitalists and/or if the 
wrong people become rich and enter venture capital financing, the critical venture capital 
competence input in the competence bloc will be lost - a political failure. Similarly, if policy 
creates a long depression of values in the stock market, making it easy for large and not very 
competent buyers to shop for bargains, often losing a winner here and there, we have again an 
instance of policy failure, not of market failure. 
The most common origin of business failure, however, is lack of competence to perceive  the 
right combination of technologies  through strategic acquisitions and divestments. For the 
acquiring company, the potential value may be much larger than the sum of values the 
acquisition objects can fetch individually in the market- if it has the competence to do it, not 
only about right, but exactly right. 
Three cases will illustrate the latter aspect in particular. 
 
Case I: Uppsala based firm in molecular diagnostics (Eurona Medicals). 
This firm was spun off from Pharmacia in 1994, when Pharmacia decided not to pursue its 
molecular diagnostics venture, a  then pioneering field aimed at making individual genetic 
diagnostics and personalized medicine possible. This market is now considered to be the 
promising area for new innovative health care (Eliasson – Eliasson 2002b). Eurona had two 
mutually supporting specialties, substance testing (lab processes, data base analysis and data 
access) and genetic diagnosis, the second specialty being the by far more innovative and 
promising venture. Here Eurona was a pioneer, perhaps too early. 
Today the average ”hit rate” for a substance is some 20 percent, meaning that most patients 
will score no hits for a while, only suffering from cumulative side effects. Some unlucky 
patients score no hits and only suffer from the side effects. The business opportunity lies in 
the fact that the genetic variation between patients makes them react differently (for the same 
disease) when prescribed the same substance. The potential lies in genetically diagnosing 
each patient, and tailoring the substance to the patient. The potential of personal medicine is, 
therefore, considered to be enormous, with equally enormous life quality improvements to be 
gained. This possibility, however, clashes with the interest of Big Pharma, that prefers one 
standardized substance for each patient and illness. Big Pharma do not have the incentives to 
be pioneers in breaking their large scale producer advantage until challenged by small   19
biomedical niche players that make successful inroads into their markets. Hence, niche 
players such as Eurona are also a socially valuable competition factor.  
  Apparently Eurona was too early and/or venture capitalists did not understand the business 
idea . Even though Eurona announced that its first diagnostics product capable of predicting 
which patients would respond positively to a particular blood pressure inhibitor would be on 
the market the same autumn (Svenska Dagbladet , June 7. 1999), the thin Swedish venture 
capital market went dead in 1999.  UK Gemini picked up Eurona at a low price from its 
”supporting” venture capitalists. Several experts interviewed within and around the company 
held widely different opinions about the time horizon for take off, from one half year to ten 
years (Eliasson 2003). Gemini, a smaller company with money, was primarily interested in 
the testing competence of Eurona to support its analysis of twins, and shelved (at least 
temporarily) whatever was left of the personalized medicine project. Gemini was introduced 
on the Nasdaq in 2000. During an interview with Gemini in late 2000, it was indicated that 
Gemini probably would have to complement its technology through strategic acquisitions. 
Seventy percent of the sources of new technology, however, reside on the West coast of the 
US. In 2001, Gemini was acquired by US Sequenom on the West coast, one of the new 
players in personal medicine.  
 
Case II; Perbio Science 
Until recently, Perbio Science was a mostly US based, but Swedish owned, company in 
biotech supplies,  headquartered in Sweden (Helsingborg).  Earlier the company had been a 
division in the Perstorp chemical group, which had acquired Pierce Chemical and Athos 
Medical in the US during the 1990s. Perbio was spun off to Perstorp´s owners in the late 
1990s. 
Perbio Science considers itself to be the supreme performer in protein cell culture, which 
accounts for more than 50 percent of sales, the world leader in voice protheses ( the Swedish 
part of the company and 9 percent of sales), and a major player in bioresearch supplies of 
reagents, kits and services for protein studies to both industry and university laboratories.  
Perbio managment had long been on the lookout for a solution to its strategic problem of 
deciding whether to invest and grow organically, grow aggressively through complementary 
strategic acquisitions or wait to be acquired at a high price. Organic growth was considered   
too slow and too risky. To be acquired would mean a US buyer only. Europe and Sweden did   20
not have the complementary receiver competence to commercialize the potential and be 
willing to pay a high price. Complementary strategic acquisition objects, in addition, could 
not be found in Europe. Lack of local Swedish management competence on which to build an 
acquisition program was also embarrasing.  To grow from a technology base in Sweden, 
therefore, was no longer considered a viable solution. 
There had been an opportunity to create a growth base in Sweden in the mid 1990s. 
Pharmacia had just merged with US UpJohn and was looking for a partner to Pharmacia 
Biotech. Discussions were conducted with Perstorp, which saw an opportunity to combine 
Perbio´s world leading cell culture technology with the world leading protein separation 
technology of Pharmacia Biotech into a global cell-culture company. The management of 
Pharmacia Biotech, however, considered Perbio too small a player and balked at the plans of 
Perbio management immediately to unload the larger but less profitable instrument activity,  
considered alien to a cell culture company.  The instrument activity was also considered a 
potential financial burden to the new company that would draw disproportionally large 
management attention and would require very large investments to become profitable , 
circumstances that would hold back growth  in the market segments where the new company 
would have the best opportunities. Rapid technology development was one reason for the 
very large investments needed in instruments, an area that was easily overrun by competitors.  
Instruments, furthermore, did not generate the desired cash flow, but needed the later sales of 
consumption chemicals.  The whole deal evaporated when UK Amersham acquired 
Pharmacia Biotech in 1997 and renamed the company Amersham Biosciencies, which was in 
turn acuired by General Electric´s Medical Businesses in 2003. GE develops and 
manufactures instruments, such as medical scanners, that already use contrast chemicals 
produced by Amersham.  
Perbio itself was acquired by US Fisher Scientific in 2003 for 155 kronor per share (Dagens 
Industri, June 27 and August 28. 2003). For Perstorp, the owners of which had acquired 
Perbio for 35 kronor when it was introduced as a separate company on the Stockholm stock 
exhange in 1999, this more than compensated for the bad stock market performance of 
Perstorp itself (Dagens Industri Nov.8. 2000). 
The choice menu for business combinatorics is great. Gothenbourg-based Nobel Biocare, a  
company formed from the diversification of the defence firm Bofors in the early 1980s, opted 
for the long and risky road of organic growth based on the Brånemark method of titanium   21
dental implants   (Fridh 2002), only to find itself almost overrun in the 1990s by a Swiss 
imitator.  Nobel Biocare sold out cheaply to a Swiss medical investor group when the stock 
market declined in 2001.  
 
Case III: Karo Bio
13 
Karo Bio is a biotech firm that operates as an intermediary in the markets between large 
pharmaceutical firms and university research. Even though the company has not fared well in 
the market recently, it is principally interesting here as a hybrid of market and hierarchical 
organization. Karo Bio’s business idea is to look for and discover business opportunities in 
academic research laboratories and to develop them commercially up to the stage of  
”routine” clinical testing, when the projects can be understood sufficiently well for a large 
pharmaceutical firm to be interested. Karo Bio contributes both entrepreneurial and venture 
capital competence (see Table 2B) to upgrade the commercial value of promising academic 
research projects. Karo Bio thus represents an intermediate organizational solution to deal 
simultaneously with both operational focus and innovative variety, through outsourcing the 
innovative and entrepreneurial function. Karo Bio then lowers the risk of committing errors of 
both type I and II by exposing each project to a more competent commercial evaluation than 
would otherwise have occurred. The project is pulled out of a commercially incompetent 
academic environment and prevented from being narrowly inspected and rejected in a big 
company environment, and so winners are probably saved. 
The complexity of this more varied evaluation is illustrated by the fact that Karo Bio (still) 
has had (1) to specialize in a few diseases that involve nuclear (hormone) receptors and (2) to 
form complementary partnerships with academic labs, specialized firms or even industrial 
customers (see item 6 in Table 2B) to broaden its competence base. The problem has even 
been raised that KaroBio has opted for the wrong screening technology (Dagens Industri 
Aug.20. 2003). The business idea is to make drug screening and discovery more efficient 
through a more innovative and efficient pre-screening process than that of the big 
pharmaceutical companies. While the big pharmaceutical companies are excellent at clinical 
testing of given substances for known biological effects, this excellence is a foolproof method 
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for missing radically new winners. So Karo Bio looks actively for winners and then applies its 
own, more efficient methods
14 to narrow the number of promising candidate substances. 
Projects may be packaged as a company, but Karo Bio prefers to offer a license deal, thus 
illustrating the importance of competent customers (industrial buyers). KaroBio claims to 
understand the potential of a project better than the customer, so why sell it for the low price 
an ”incompetent” customer is offering? If you can finance development yourself, wait and 
license. Then you can increase the price when the buyer finally apprehends the situation. 
Again, this also illustrates the importance of a competent venture capitalist, who understands 
better than the big industrial customer how promising the project really is. Such competence 
is rare externally, but it exists, and Karo Bio aims for reaching the level needed to be  its own 
sustainable venture capital provider.
      
 
5.  The Existence of a market for strategic acquisitions- the Third Problem 
 
The big firm has the money but not the capacity to create and to bring radically new ideas to 
the attention of its decision makers. The small firm/entrepreneur has the ideas but not the 
money. In between the two there is the market for innovations (Day – Eliasson – Wihlborg 
1993), in which radically new ideas are developed as far as is needed for an industrialist to 
understand the commercial potential. This development is intermediated by the actors of the 
competence bloc, notably the actors in the venture capital and exit markets. For the little firm 
to capture the rents of its own innovative capacity (competence capital), it is dependent on the 
efficient functioning of these two markets. Speedy access to venture capital often decides the 
outcome. The small innovative firm, therefore, depends more than other firms on the 
competence of the actors in the financial markets to understand what they are doing. 
There are six principally different strategies for the small, innovative firm to pursue (Å. 
Eliasson 2002 and Table 3). It can (1) go slowly and organically, at the rate internal finance 
permits, (2) grow aggressively through external acquisitions, (3) opt for internal growth, 
based on external venture capital, (4) aim at being strategically acquired by a large firm, (5) 
develop technologies for licensing or (6) do contract work. The categories in Table 3 
correspond to a different assignment of ownership and control rights and/or different 
contracts, each involving different risk. The risk level decreases as you go down Table 3, but 
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potential profits increase as you go the other way. Each strategic choice, or each combination 
of choices, corresponds to a different definition of the hierarchy or the firm.  
      (Table 3 in about here) 
Strategies (2) and (3) can be combined. It is quite common among small biotechnology firms 
(also cf. US high tech firms in Eliasson 2000a, p. 234) to aim for internal growth, but to sell 
out if a suitor offers a sufficiently high price. The most demanding and the most risky, but 
also the potentially most rewarding, approach of the small innovative firm with a potential 
inhouse winner is to grow through a combination of early venture capital and own strategic 
acquisitions to complement its own technologies to reach industrial scale production and 
distribution quickly. As we have concluded already, for the risks to be reasonable under this 
strategy, a vertically complete and a sufficiently varied competence bloc has to be in place. 
Only then can the potential winner confidently continue searching for new resources on its 
own. There are increasing returns to continued search. 
 The objectives of a new start- up firm are not independent of its sources of finance and the 
agreements on risk sharing.  There are three principally different ways of funding the 
commercialization of a radically new innovation (Eliasson, Å. 2002). 
a.  High Risk venture (items 2 and 3 inTable 3) 
   Build the company to industry level on external venture financing 
b.  Medium Risk venture ( item 4) 
   Aim for product being strategically acquired by large company 
c.  Low Risk venture ( items 5 and 6) 
    License or do contract work. 
The first high risk venture requires the support of a complete competence bloc.  The second 
medium risk venture requires the existence of fully developed markets for strategic 
acquisitions, notably for bidding up prices of acquired objects sufficiently to establish 
incentives for innovators. The low risk ambition requires that there are sophisticated and large  
customers for technology in the market. While the US offers the whole range of options a, b 
and c, Europe offers c and only to some extent b, but not much of a.  
The market for strategic acquisitions allows the small, advanced biotechnology firm to 
complement its competence and technologies through acquiring a firm or part of a firm. This 
is a way to increase its rate of growth, compared to internal development of the same technol-
ogies and to capture the market ahead of imitators. The large pharmaceutical company can 
acquire know-how it has been unable to develop internally through firm acquisitions. Small,   24
innovative firms can supply their technologies in the same market at high prices if many big 
firms compete for their technology. If a profitable selling opportunity arises, the small, 
innovative firms growing internally through venture capital finance and/or through 
acquisitions might opt out of that strategy and sell out. The more options, the higher the 
probability that winners are identified and allocated to the right users.  
A strategic acquisition is a means for a firm to solve a particular business problem. It is, 
however, also a matter of interest for the policy maker, since the non-availability of a 
dynamically efficient market for strategic acquisitions limits new firm formation both 
technologically and financially, and, hence, growth. We have shown (in terms of competence 
bloc theory) how the large firm can internalize ”over the market” a dynamically efficient 
integration of innovative capability and large-scale operations efficiency. Strategic 
acquisitions, furthermore, are an increasingly important channel of technology diffusion. This 
time we see an innovative organizational solution that bridges the inability of large 
operations-oriented firms to be creative and the difficulties of the creative (innovative) small 
firm to capture the rents from its winning innovations. The market for strategic acquisitions 
creates value where technology might otherwise be wasted. The venture capital market and 
the market for strategic acquisitions embodies industrial competence within finance, thereby 
raising the competence each project is exposed to in the evaluation process of the competence 
bloc. It is in the interest of all parties in the game (seller, buyer and government) that a 
competitive market for strategic acquisitions develops where the value of the winner (firm) is 
bid up to the highest price the most competent acquiring firm is willing to pay. Cheap 
acquisitions will then be stopped. This market has to be global, and it appears to be the case 
(see Eliasson 2001b) that high technology can be acquired at a distance, since only competent 
customers are in this market. The market for strategic acquisitions enhances the flexibility of 
choice for the small firm to commercialize winning technologies on their own, and for the 
large and less innovative companies to access new technologies through acquisitions. This 
was the third problem.   
 
6.  The diffuse notion of a hierarchy – the theory of the firm revisited 
 
The fathers of economics were not really interested in industrial dynamics, but rather in the 
”higher level” policy problems of Government. The economists of those days were satisfied 
with discussing technologies and industries defined as aggregates, and possibly factories. The   25
role of live firms in wealth creation was rarely addressed, except as in Smith (1776) referring 
both to the joint stock company as a socially negative privilege or monopoly, and to the 
importance of new firm formation for exposing these monopolies to competition.   
 Industrial monopoly formation and antitrust problems brought the firm into policy focus in 
the late 19
th century in the US, and then again in the 1930s. Industrial organization theory 
developed from this policy base (Scherer 1980), but was rapidly (in the 1980s) integrated 
with the  neoclassical tradition. Since there was no place for firm dynamics in  static 
equilibrium,  no distinction was made between the innovator, the entrepreneur , the venture 
capitalist and the industrialist. They were either bunched together in a firm or sector 
production function or assumed to be fully outsourceable (in so far as their knowledge 
mattered) in perfect markets [see for instance Fama (1980)]. 
Coase brought an end to this tradition in 1937, a contribution the importance of which was not 
realized until decades later. In practice, all the (competence) functions of the competence bloc 
are now coming apart in the markets in a truly Coasian fashion, and new C&C technology is 
playing a critical role in making such distributed, still integrated production both possible and 
profitable . Outsourcing, however, is not the same as the separability of Fisher (1930), which 
is one of the corner stones of modern financial economics. Fisherian separability is 
incompatible with dynamic or Schumpeterian efficiency, since striving to reduce transaction 
costs within the extended firm boundaries involves attempting to minimize the extended 
definition of transaction costs by reorganizing the limits of the firm. This also takes us outside 
the mainstream definition of the firm as formulated by Holmström-Tirole (1989) since that 
definition is based on transaction costs minimization over a given firm hierarchy. Integrated 
production based on modularization and outsourcing over the market can be organized very 
differently and some of all possible organizational designs exhibit very large, positive 
systemic productivity gains (Eliasson 1996b). A systems responsible firm coordinates the 
whole, and the systems coordinating competence is one of the strong competitive advantages 
of the advanced western industrial firms. The dynamics of integrated production, however, 
still diffuse the notion of the firm as a well defined and centrally controlled hierarchy.  
Integrated production defines the extended firm based in an increasingly sophisticated system 
of specialized subcontractors. Integrated production requires control rights that can be 
organized through the assignment of appropriately designed property rights (ownership) and 
contracts superimposed on physical manufacturing and distribution . The dynamics of 
contracting and recontracting of the extended firm is, however, moved by people with   26
competence (Eliasson 1990a), forging temporary configurations  of property rights  in the 
market for strategic acquisitions. It is an economically viable entity to the extent it can be 
configured to lower transaction (read information and communications) costs. This may be 
possible if (1) the competence bloc is vertically complete and sufficiently varied horizontally 
and (2) if transaction costs are understood to include the potential loss of winners. The large 
potential systemic productivity effects that a competent organizer can realize are an incentive 
for the formation of distributed and integrated production. Hence, there will be a demand for 
supporting markets for strategic acquisitions to develop. We can also conclude theoretically 
that the development of such markets for strategic acquisitions to support the free formation 
of extended firm arrangements will be a contributing factor behind  the successful formation 
of a New Economy. We have already indicated that deficiencies on this score may be what 
keeps the US economy racing ahead of Europe. 
 
7.  Is Europe a bunch of laggards? 
The markets for innovation, entrepreneurship and venture capital in their developed form 
(Day – Eliasson – Wihlborg, 1993) are fairly new.  One might safely say that the US is the 
only economy that features an advanced venture capital industry capable of evaluating and 
financing large scale, radically new innovative projects (Eliasson 2003). There are several 
reasons for this. First, the US economy, notably California, has a larger concentration and 
diversity of wealthy people than any other country, people who have become rich through 
private industrial activities, notably in the new industries. Second, deregulation of the US 
insurance markets in the 1970s allowed the insurance industry to enter the venture capital 
market. The supply situation then was dramatically changed for the better, notably through 
the creation of very deep exit markets. Third, the early start of new high technology industries 
expanded the set of industrially experienced and rich individuals that now populate the 
venture capital industry. Together, this means that the formation of sophistical markets for 
strategic acquisitions began in the US. Overcoming the handicap of financial markets lacking 
industrial experience in Europe is no easy task, and it is not supported by the political 
ambitions in Europe of making the formation of private wealth through innovative industrial 
ventures difficult. 
The scarcity of competent venture capitalists who understand radically new technology might 
mean that small European start-up firms will have difficulties funding both their own internal 
expansion and an aggressive expansion through own acquisitions because  ”incompetent”   27
local venture capitalists take too long to make decisions and/or take too large a share of the 
capital gains. There will be a bias towards selling out. For a small country, this will probably 
be to a foreign suitor as was the case with Eurona and Perbio Science. This problem is 
interesting because both Sweden and Europe are as advanced in both health care technology 
(Eliasson 1997b, Eliasson – Eliasson 2002b) and in agricultural biotechnology (Å. Eliasson, 
2002) as the US, but both lack commercial and industrial competence, including venture 
capital competence, compared to the US. Hence, there might be a bias in the flow of 
industrialized technology from Europe to the US.  
Already in the early 1980s, US venture capital was eying Swedish Pharmacia and Danish 
Novo, at the time erroneously believed to be on the verge of a technology breakthrough in 
biotech (Eliasson, 2003). It was also suggested (Eliasson 1997b) that US venture capital be 
invited to invest in Sweden, to compensate for the lack of commercial and venture capital 
competence in Swedish health care.  Foreign venture capital would help create a market for 
strategic acquisitions, raising the economic value of locally developed technology that might 
otherwise be wasted. 
One could argue that the European economies at least feature a large number of potential 
industrial buyers in the market for strategic acquisitions. This positive factor  is, however, 
diminished by the relative dominance in Europe of old, mature and most likely conservative 
firms. There is a reason for this. Legal rules and policy makers in Europe bias incentive 
systems in favor of large firms, meaning, by definition, a bias against the small, innovative 
firms. One reason for this negative bias in incentive systems has been the political ambition in 
some countries to control private industry, which can only be accomplished if the firms are 
few and large (Eliasson 1998a,pp.64ff). Another reason has been a concern about 
unemployment and the assumed protective internal labor markets of large firms.   
In conclusion, then, the receiver competence at the economy-wide level, or the capacity of the 
economy at large to take on and build new businesses on new technologies, is not only 
deficient in Europe compared to the US because of incomplete and horizontally less varied 
competence blocs, but also because of a political reluctance to allow the markets to push 
freely for change. Europe, therefore, is more exposed to the risks of committing business 
mistakes of type II (i.e. losing the winners) than the US. The gestation period to correct the 
situation (build competence and change policies) and to see positive results may, however, be 
too long for political patience to survive. The policy catch is paradoxical. Austrian/European 
economists were the first to realize the nature of a dynamically growing economy. This   28
understanding has been washed out in mainstream textbook economic theory and research in 
favor of an economic theory refined to perfection in the US that is more a theory of central 
planning than it is of a dynamic economy. But real industrial dynamics is to be found in the 
US, more so than in Europe. 
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Table 1.  The four mechanisms of Schumpeterian creative destruction and economic 
  growth 
1.Innovative entry 




4.Exit (shut down) 
Source: ”Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. Lindbeck (ed.), Nya  
villkor för ekonomi och politik (SOU 1993:16) and G. Eliasson (1996a, p. 45).   
 
Table 2A.  The dominant selection problem 
Error Type I:  Losers kept too long 
Error Type II: Winners rejected 
Source: Eliasson – Eliasson, 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 78-
4







Table 2B.  Actors in the competence bloc 
1.  Competent and active customers  
2.  Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 
3.  Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 
4.  Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs 
5.  Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 
6.  Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production  
Source: Eliasson – Eliasson, 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 78-
4
0, Trimestre.    33
 
Table 3.  Strategic choices for the small innovative firm 
1.  Do it alone, slowly on internal funds and risk going bankrupt or being imitated early by a 
big company. 
2.  Grow internally and share the risks and profits with an external venture capitalist, often 
unfavorably.   
3.  Grow aggressively through strategic acquisitions or external venture capital and/or 
paying with own stock and dependent on the competence of actors in the stock market to 
value your company. 
4.  Aim for being strategically acquired at a high price. 
5.  License your technologies. 
7.  Do contract work. 
Source: Eliasson, Åsa, 2002. A competence bloc analysis of the economic potential of biotechnology in 
agriculture and food production; in Carlsson, Bo (ed.),  2002. New Technological systems in the Bio Industries. 













Figure 1.  Rates of return (per cent), 1982 and 1997 
Note: Swedish manufacturing industry. 


























Source: MOSES database. 
 
 
 